We study the incentives that governments have to protect intellectual property in a trading world economy. We consider a world economy with ongoing innovation in two countries that differ in market size, in their capacities for innovation, and in their absolute and comparative advantage in manufacturing.
In a country that is closed to international trade, the design of a system of IPR protection poses a clear trade-off to a welfare-maximizing government. By strengthening the protection of intellectual property, a government provides greater incentives for innovation and thus the benefits that come from having more and better products.
But, at the same time, it curtails potential competition for firms that have previously innovated and thus limits the benefits that can be realized from existing products.
As Nordhaus (1969) argued, the optimal patent policy equates the marginal dynamic benefit with the marginal static efficiency loss.
But in an open economy, the trade-offs are not so clear cut. International trade spreads the benefits of innovation beyond national boundaries. This means that a country does not reap all of the global benefits that come from protecting intellectual property within its borders. Moreover, countries differ in their capacities for innovation due to differences in skill endowments and technical know-how. It is not obvious how a government ought to set its national IPR policy if some of the benefits of its national innovation accrue to foreigners, if its constituents benefit from innovations that are encouraged and take place beyond its boundaries, and if domestic and foreign firms differ in their ability to innovate.
Some previous research has addressed the question of whether a country with a limited capacity to innovate will benefit from extending IPR protection to foreign inventors. Chin and Grossman (1990) and Deardorff (1992) investigated the welfare effects of extending patent protection from the country in which innovation takes place to another country that only consumes the innovative products. Both of these papers treat the investment in R&D as a once-off decision. In contrast, Helpman (1993) models innovation as an ongoing process and associates the strength of the IPR regime with the flow probability that a given product protected by a patent in the North will be imitated in the South. He evaluates the welfare consequences of marginal changes in the rate of imitation. These papers do not, however, consider the simultaneous choice of IPR protection by trade partners, nor do they discuss what international regime of IPR protection would be globally efficient. 1 In this paper, we study the incentives that governments have to protect intellectual property in a trading world economy. We consider a world economy with ongoing innovation in which there are two countries that differ in market sizes, in their capacities for innovation, and in their absolute and comparative advantages in manufacturing. Innovators develop the designs for new products, each of which has a limited economic life. We associate the strength of IPR protection with the duration of a country's patents. Patents provide inventors with exclusive rights to produce, sell and distribute their products within a country. We study a regime with national treatment, which means that the same protection is provided to all inventors regardless of their national origin.
We begin in Section 2 with the case of a closed economy. There we re-examine the trade-off between static costs and dynamic benefits that was first studied by Nordhaus. We derive a neat formula that characterizes the optimal patent policy in a closed economy, and discuss the determinants of the optimal patent length. One interesting finding is that the optimal duration of patents is independent of the size of the economy.
In Section 3, we describe the determination of national policies in a non-cooperative regime of patent protection. We derive best response functions for the "North" and the "South," where the North is assumed to have a higher wage than the South, as well as possibly a larger market for innovative products and a greater capacity for innovation. The best response is a patent length that maximizes a country's national welfare, given the duration of patents in its trading partner. The wage gap between countries creates a difference in manufacturing costs, which bears on the country's non-cooperative policy choices. In particular, we identify important differences in the incentives that the countries have to extend their patent lengths when the high wage country has the longer patents as compared to when the low wage country has the longer patents.
In Section 4, we ask, Why are patents longer in the North? We address this question by considering the comparative statics of the Nash equilibrium. The fact that the North has greater research capability than the South is not enough to explain its longer patents. But we are able to show that the Nash equilibrium patents will be longer in the North than in the South if the North's market for innovative products is at least as large as that in the South and if the North's relative advantage in R&D is sufficiently great.
We study international patent agreements in Section 5. First we derive the properties of an efficient global regime of patent protection. If the countries can make international transfer payments or compensate one another in policy areas other than IPR protection, then an efficient patent regime is one that provides the optimal aggregate incentives for innovation to inventors throughout the world. These incentives can be achieved by various combinations of patent policies in the two countries, so there is no unique pair of patent lengths that is needed for global efficiency. Even if international transfers are not possible, the efficient policies will be ones that provide the optimal aggregate incentive for R&D, at least for a range of distributions of national welfare levels. However, when international transfers do not occur, the welfare levels of the North and the South will depend on which pair of efficient patent lengths is selected. Among combinations of policies that give the same overall incentives for global research, the North fares better, and the South worse, the longer are patents in the South. An implication of our findings is that harmonization of patent policies is neither necessary nor sufficient for global efficiency. Moreover, starting from a non-cooperative equilibrium with longer patents in the North than in the South, an efficient agreement calling for harmonization of patent lengths typically serves the interests of the North, quite possibly at the expense of the South.
Readers familiar with the literature on trade policy will recognize a familiar structure in our inquiry. Our examination of a non-cooperative regime of patent protection is analogous to Johnson's (1953-54 ) study of non-cooperative tariff setting by two large countries. Our subsequent identification of the efficient combinations of patent policies is analogous to Mayer's (1981) similar examination of the efficient combinations of trade policies. We, like Mayer, associate the efficiency frontier with the possible outcomes of an international negotiation. Our findings concerning the non-cooperative and cooperative outcomes are summarized in Section 6.
A Simple Model of Innovation
In this section, we construct a simple model of ongoing innovation. We develop the model for a closed economy and use it to revisit the question of the optimal patent length that was first addressed by Nordhaus (1969) . Our model yields a neat formula that characterizes the trade-off between the static costs and dynamic benefits of extending the period of patent protection. The discussion of a closed economy lays the groundwork for the more subtle analysis of the international system that we undertake in the sections that follow.
The economy has two sectors, one that produces a homogeneous good and another that produces a continuum of differentiated products. The designs for the differentiated products result from private investments in R&D. Once a good has been invented, it has a finite economic life of lengthτ . That is, a new product potentially provides utility to consumers for a period ofτ from the time of its creation, whereupon its value to consumers drops to zero.
There are M consumers with identical preferences. We shall refer to M as the "size of the market." 2 The representative consumer maximizes a utility function of the form
where
y(z) is consumption of the homogeneous good at time z, x(i, z) is consumption of the i th variety of differentiated product at time z, and n(z) is the measure of differentiated products invented before z that still hold value to consumers at time z. We assume
The third assumption ensures a positive demand for every variety at any finite price. The fourth ensures that any firm holding a patent for a differentiated product will charge a finite price.
A consumer maximizes utility by purchasing some of all varieties that are not yet obsolete. He chooses x(i, z) so that h 0 [x(i, z)] = p(i, z) for all i and z, where p(i, z) is the price of variety i at time t. After the consumer makes all of his optimal purchases of differentiated products at time z, he devotes the remainder of his spending to the homogeneous good y. Spending is always positive in the equilibria we describe.
This means that the interest rate is constant and equal to ρ, from the condition for intertemporal optimization. 2 In our model, demand for differentiated products does not vary with income. Thus, a rich country need not have a larger market for these goods than a poor country. Nonetheless, we prefer to think of the market for differentiated goods as being larger in the North than in the South. This could be rigorously justified within our model if we were to suppose that differentiated products provide utility only after a threshold level of consumption of the homogeneous goods has been reached. Then, a rich country is likely to have more consumers who surpass the threshold.
Manufacturing requires only labor. Any firm can produce good y with b units of labor per unit of output. All known varieties of the differentiated product can be produced with a units of labor per unit of output. But the government grants the original designer of a differentiated product the sole rights of production and sale for a period of length τ . We assume that patents are perfectly enforced.
The design of new varieties requires both labor and human capital. We take
, where φ(z) is the flow of new inventions at time z, H is the (constant) stock of human capital, and L R (z) is the amount of labor devoted to R&D. Note thatṅ(z) = φ(z) − φ(z −τ ), because the goods that were invented at time z −τ become obsolete at time z.
We assume that F (·) is homogeneous of degree one and that γ(
is a non-increasing function of L. We shall see that γ is the elasticity of research output with respect to the value of a patent and that our restriction that it is nonincreasing ensures that the second-order condition for the optimal patent length is satisfied. If the research technology is Cobb-Douglas -an example that we shall use in several places -then γ is constant and equal to the ratio of the cost share of labor to the cost share of human capital. 3 If the research technology has a constant elasticity of substitution, γ is a non-increasing function of L for any elasticity of substitution less than or equal to one.
We describe now the static and dynamic equilibrium for an economy that has a patent duration of τ . In equilibrium, firms with live patents for differentiated products behave as monopolies. Each such firm faces an inverse demand curve from each of the M consumers with the form p(x) = h 0 (x). The firm sets its price so that
where w is the wage rate and x is sales per consumer. This is the usual monopoly-pricing rule whereby the markup over unit cost as a fraction of the price is equal to the inverse demand elasticity. Optimal pricing yields a typical patent holder profits of π per consumer, and total profits of M π.
When a patent expires, competitors can imitate the good costlessly. Then the product sells for the competitive price of p = aw and generates no further profits. 3 In other words, if
This pricing of the good continues until the good becomes obsolete. Meanwhile, the homogeneous good always carries the competitive price of bw, which, because this good is the numeraire, implies that w = 1/b. In writing this condition, we implicitly assume that the economy's labor supply is sufficiently large that some labor remains for production of the homogeneous good after all derived demand for labor for producing differentiated products and conducting R&D has been satisfied.
Labor engages in manufacturing and R&D. The labor employed in manufacturing differentiated goods is just the amount needed to produce the quantities demanded at the equilibrium prices. The allocation of labor to R&D is such that its marginal value product in this activity is equal to the wage rate. Thus,
where v is the value of a new patent. Since there is no uncertainty about future earnings, patents are worth the discounted value of the profits they generate in the time before they expire, or
We can see from (3) and (4) that an increase in the patent length increases the value of a new patent, thereby drawing additional resources into R&D.
The final equilibrium condition equates savings with investment. Savings are the difference between national income rH + wL + n m M π and aggregate spending E, where r is the return to human capital, L is the aggregate labor supply, and n m is the number of differentiated products that retain their patent protection. All investment is devoted to R&D. This activity has an aggregate cost of rH + wL R . Thus, we can write the equilibrium condition as
It is useful to calculate an expression for aggregate welfare at date 0, the time at which a new (optimal) patent policy will be set by the government. By assumption, this patent protection applies only to goods introduced after time 0; those introduced beforehand are subject to whatever policy was in effect at the time of their invention. 4 At each moment in time, each of the M consumers enjoys surplus of C m = h(x m ) − p m x m from his consumption of any good under patent. Here, x m is the amount sold by the typical monopoly to the typical consumer and p m is the monopoly price. We distinguish between those goods invented before time 0 and those invented afterward.
The former yield some exogenous surplus that is unaffected by the new patent policy.
Of the latter, there are sφ at time s, for s between 0 and τ , and a constant number τ φ thereafter. Each consumer also enjoys surplus of C c = h(x c )−p c x c from his purchases of any competitively-priced variety of the differentiated product, where x c and p c are the quantity and price of a typical one of these purchases. Again, the competitivelypriced goods that were invented before time 0 yield some exogenous surplus. The number of such goods invented after time 0 that are still economically viable at time s is 0 for s ≤ τ , (s − τ ) φ for s between τ andτ , and (τ − τ ) φ, for s ≥τ . Using (1), (2) and (5), we calculate that utility at time 0 is
where Λ 0 is the discounted present value of the consumer surplus and profits derived from goods invented before time 0, and where T ≡ (1 − e −ρτ ) /ρ andT ≡
(1 − e −ρτ ) /ρ. Note that T is the present discounted value of a flow of one dollar from time 0 to time τ , and thatT has an analogous interpretation.
We are now ready to derive the optimal patent length for a closed economy.
Formally, we maximize U (0) with respect to τ , after recalling that φ = F (H, L R ) and that L R is a function of τ via (3) and (4). 5 It is more intuitive, however, to describe 4 It would never be optimal for the government to extend patent protection on goods that have already been invented. This would create deadweight loss without any offsetting social benefit.
The government might wish to eliminate protection for goods that were invented under a different regime, but we assume that such expropriation of intellectual property would not be legal. 5 Equivalentlly, we can maximize ρU(0) over the choice of T . Note that C m , C c and π do not depend on the duration of patents and thus do not depend on T . We can combine (3) and (4) to write MπT F L (H, L R ) = w, which allows us to solve for the functional relationship betwen the labor devoted to R&D and the policy variable T ; denote it by L R (T ). Then, substituting this expression the social costs and benefits that derive from extending the patent length marginally from a given length τ . The cost of lengthening the period of patent protection is that the economy suffers the deadweight loss of M (C c − C m − π) on each of the differentiated products invented after time 0 for a marginally longer period of time.
If the patent period is lengthened at time 0, the extra deadweight loss kicks in at time τ , and continues thereafter. The flow of new products isṅ per unit time. Thus, the total marginal cost, discounted to time 0, is
The benefit to the economy of extending the patent length is that it encourages R&D, which in turn means a greater variety of differentiated products. Each differentiated product yields discounted consumer surplus of MC m T over its life as a patented product and MC c (T − T ) over its life as a competitively-priced product, where in each case the discounting is back to the time of invention. Now if we discount this flow of benefits back to time 0, and multiply by the number of new inventions induced by a marginal lengthening of the patent period, we have the total marginal benefit, which is equal to
Using (3), we can calculate that
thus, γ is the elasticity of innovation with respect to the value of a patent, as previously claimed. Also, (4) implies
into (6) and rearranging terms, we can write the maximand as
The first-order condition for a maximum requires
from which (7) follows.
We substitute these terms into the expression for marginal benefit, and equate this to the marginal cost. This gives an implicit formula for the optimal patent length,
The assumption that γ 0 < 0 ensures that the second-order condition is satisfied.
From (7) we see that the optimal patent is longer, the greater is the useful life of a product (largerτ ), the more patient are consumers (smaller ρ), and the greater is the ratio of consumer surplus plus profits under monopoly to consumer surplus with competition. All of these findings accord well with intuition. One noteworthy feature of (7) is that the size of the market has no bearing on the optimal patent length in a closed economy. In a closed economy, the first-best level of R&D -that which maximizes discounted utility when all goods are competitively priced -is an increasing function of market size. This is because innovation is a public good, and the Samuelsonian rule for optimal provision of a public good calls for greater output when the benefits can be spread across more consumers. But the encouragement of innovation by patents achieves only a second best. An increase in M enhances both the marginal benefit of extending patents and the marginal cost of doing so, and does so in equal proportions. Thus, the optimal patent length in a closed economy is invariant to market size.
Noncooperative Patent Protection
In this section, we study the national incentives for protection of intellectual property in a world economy with imitation and trade. We derive the Nash equilibria of a game in which two countries set their patent policies simultaneously and noncooperatively.
The countries are distinguished by their wage rates, their market sizes, and their stocks of human capital. The last of these proxies for their different capacities for R&D. We shall term the countries "North" and "South," in keeping with our desire to understand the tensions that surrounded the tightening of IPR protection in the developing countries in the last decade. Canada. We do not mean the labels North and South to rule out the application of our analysis to these other sorts of relationships.
The Global IPR Regime
The model is a natural extension of the one presented in Section 2. Consumers in the two countries share identical preferences. In each country, the representative consumer maximizes the intertemporal utility function in (1). The instantaneous utility of a consumer in country j now is given by
where y j (z) is consumption of the homogeneous good by a typical resident of country j at time z, x j (i, z) is consumption of the i th differentiated product by a resident of country j at time z, and n j (z) is the number of differentiated varieties previously invented in country j that remain economically viable at time z. There are M N consumers in the North and M S consumers in the South. While we do not place any restrictions on the relative sizes of the two markets at this juncture, we shall be most interested in the case where M N > M S . 7 It does not matter for our analysis whether consumers can borrow and lend internationally or not.
In country j, it takes b j units of labor to produce one unit of the homogeneous good. We assume that b N < b S , and that, in equilibrium, the numeraire good is produced in both countries. This implies w N > w S . The technology for producing a differentiated product reflects the country in which the good was invented. A variety that was developed in country j requires a j units of labor per unit of production, where a N ≤ a S . 8 Of course, the rights to produce such goods may be limited by patent protection. For now, we rule out direct foreign investment, so the proprietary owner of a technology for producing a differentiated product must undertake its manufacturing in the same country in which its R&D was conducted.
New goods are invented in each region according to
, where H j is the human capital endowment of country j, and L Rj is the labor devoted to R&D in country j. The natural case to consider is H N > H S , but we do not impose this as a restriction.
We now describe the IPR regime. In each country, there is national treatment in the granting of patent rights. Under national treatment, the government of country j grants a patent of length τ j to all inventors of differentiated products regardless of there national origins. In other words, we assume that foreign firms and domestic firms have equal standing in applying for patents in any country. National treatment is required by the TRIPs agreement and it characterized the laws that were in place in most countries even before this agreement. 9 In our model, a patent is an exclusive right to make, sell, use, or import a product for a fixed period of time (see Maskus, 2000a, p.36 ). This means that, when good i is under patent protection in country j, no firm other than the patent holder or one designated by it may produce the good in country j for domestic sale or for export, nor may the good be imported into country j from an unauthorized producer outside the country. We also rule out parallel imports -unauthorized imports of good i that were produced by the patent holder or its designee, but that were sold to a third party outside country j. 10 When parallel imports are prevented, patent holders can practice price discrimination across national markets.
We solve the Nash game in which the governments set their patent policies onceand-for-all at time 0. These patents apply only to good invented after time 0; goods invented beforehand continue to receive the protections afforded at their times of invention. So long as the governments cannot curtail patents that were previously awarded, the economy has no state variables that bear on the choice of optimal patent policies at a given moment in time. This means that the Nash equilibrium in once-
and-for-all patents is also a sub-game perfect equilibrium in the infinitely repeated game in which the governments can change their patent policies periodically, or even continuously. Of course, the repeated game may have other equilibria in which the governments base their policies at a point in time on the history of policies that were chosen previously. We do not investigate such equilibria with tacit cooperation here, but rather postpone our discussion of cooperation until Section 5.
Let us describe, for given patent lengths τ N and τ S , the life cycle of a typical differentiated product invented in the North and that of a typical product invented in the South. For this, we must distinguish a global patent regime with τ N > τ S from a regime with τ N < τ S . Consider first a product invented in the North. During an initial phase after the product is developed, the inventor holds a patent in both countries. 10 The 
The Best Response Functions
We are now ready to derive the best response function for each country. The best response function for the South gives the patent length τ S that maximizes aggregate welfare in the South as a function of a given τ N . Similarly, the best response function for the North gives the patent length τ N that maximizes Northern welfare, given the patent policy of the South. Conceptually, we proceed as follows. First, we examine the first-order condition that must be satisfied by τ S if τ S > 0 and we impose the restriction that τ N > τ S . Then, we examine the first-order condition that must be satisfied if τ S <τ and we suppose that τ N < τ S . Finally, we consider the South's optimal choice of patent length for given τ N without any restrictions.
Given τ N > τ S , the South bears two costs from prolonging its patents slightly.
First, this extends the period during which it suffers a static deadweight loss of on goods that were invented in the North. Notice that the profits earned by Northern producers in the South are not an offset to this latter marginal cost, because they accrue to residents of the North. The marginal benefit to the South that comes from prolonging its patents reflects the increased incentive that Northern and Southern firms have to undertake R&D. If the welfare-maximizing τ S is positive and less than τ N , then the marginal cost of increasing τ S must equal the marginal benefit, which implies
, and v j is the value of a new patent for a good invented in country j.
The terms on the left-hand side of (9) reflect respectively the marginal cost of extending the deadweight loss in the South on Southern products and the marginal cost of postponing the competitive pricing of Northern products. The terms on the right-hand side of (9) reflect the benefit to Southern consumers from the induced spur to innovation in the South and North, respectively. Equation (9) is depicted by the curve S 1 S 1 in Figure 1 , including both the boldface and dotted portions (more on this in a moment). Notice that we have drawn the curve only for points above the 45
• line, inasmuch as the stated first-order condition applies only when τ N > τ S . We illustrate a case in which the curve is downward sloping, as it must be when the countries have identical Cobb-Douglas research production functions. 11 Intuitively, as τ N increases, labor is drawn into R&D in both countries.
This reduces the responsiveness of global innovation to a given change in τ S . If the fraction of world innovation that takes place in each country does not change by too much (as will be the case if γ S is approximately equal to γ N ) then the South's best response is to set a shorter patent of its own. Now suppose that τ S > τ N . In this case, the marginal cost to the South of prolonging its patents has an additional, negative term. It includes as before terms reflecting an extended period of deadweight loss on goods invented in the South and an extended period of diminished consumer surplus on goods invented in the North. 11 With identical Cobb-Douglas research functions, γ S and γ N are identical constants, and ω is independent of τ S and τ N . Then the marginal benefit declines with τ N and the second-order condition (which is satisfied) ensures dτ N /dτ S < 0 along S 1 S 1 .
But these costs are diminished by the lengthening of a period during which Southern firms earn positive profits ofπ S per consumer in the Northern market. Meanwhile, the marginal benefit to the South of prolonging its patents is greater than before, for somewhat the same reason. Since an increase in τ S extends a phase in which Southern monopolists earn M S π S + M NπS , rather than just M S π S , it has a greater impact on the rate of Southern innovation than when τ N > τ S . The first-order condition that applies in place of (9) is
The curve S 2 S 2 in Figure 1 represents equation (10) . It too must be downward sloping when the countries have identical Cobb-Douglas research technologies.
12 Notice that S 2 S 2 is shifted to the right relative to a continuation of the curve S 1 S 1 .
This displacement reflects the extra marginal benefit and reduced marginal cost of extending the patent length τ S in situations where τ S > τ N as compared to when
Each point on S 1 S 1 gives a τ S that locally maximizes U S for the given value of τ N . 13 Similarly, the points on S 2 S 2 are locally optimal responses. To identify the best response to a given τ N , we need to compare the welfare levels achieved at the local optima, as well as recognize the constraints on patent length. Consider, for example, the point at the intersection of S 1 S 1 with the 45
• line, where τ N = τ 1 . It is not 12 In the figure, we depict a case in which the S 2 S 2 curve hits the horizontal axis at a value of τ S less thanτ. In this case, the constraint on the length of the Southern patent -which can be no longer than the economic life of a product -never is binding. If the constraint does bind for some values of τ N , the S 2 S 2 curve will be situated above the horizontal axis at τ N = 0. 13 This presumes that the second-order condition is satisfied for points on the curve, as in fact it must be if the countries have identical Cobb-Douglas research production functions.
optimal for the South's government to choose τ 1 in response to τ N = τ 1 , because the marginal benefit to the South of increasing its patent length is discretely larger than the marginal cost for τ S slightly larger than τ 1 . The South's best response to τ 1 is given by the relevant point on S 2 S 2 . Now consider the point of intersection of S 2 S 2 with the 45
• line, where τ N = τ 2 . By a similar argument, it is not optimal for the South to choose τ 2 in response to τ N = τ 2 , because the the marginal cost of extending the patent length exceeds the marginal benefit of doing so for τ S slightly less than τ 2 . In this case, the best response is to be found on the S 1 S 1 curve. The
South's best response function is represented by a boldface curve in Figure 1 with a discontinuity at τ N =τ . The discontinuity comes at the value of τ N at which the two local maxima yield the same level of utility.
We examine now the best responses in the North. Our procedure is the same.
First, we consider the first-order condition for a locally optimal τ N given τ S and assuming τ N > τ S . Then we consider the first-order condition for a local optimum when τ N < τ S . Finally, we find the global optimum.
If τ N > τ S , an extension of the patent length in the North prolongs the period during which this country suffers deadweight loss on goods invented in the North and prolongs the period during which it faces monopoly prices for goods invented in the South. Meanwhile, the longer patents enhance the discounted profits from new innovations, and so augment the incentive for R&D in each region. Analogous to (9), we have the following condition equating the per-consumer marginal cost and marginal benefit:
This curve is depicted by N 1 N 1 in Figure 1 .
Like S 1 S 1 , the N 1 N 1 curve must slope downward when the countries share identical
Cobb-Douglas technologies in the research sector. More generally, we cannot rule out the possibility that the curve is upward sloping for part or all of its length. If the countries do have identical Cobb-Douglas research technologies and the S 1 S 1 and N 1 N 1 curves happen to intersect in the region in which τ N > τ S , then the absolute value of the slope of the former curve must exceed the absolute value of the slope of the latter at the point of intersection, as is required for the "stability" of a Nash equilibrium.
14 When τ S > τ N , the first-order condition for maximizing U N becomes
whereΩ N ≡ 1 −Ω S . The first term on the left-hand side of (12) The claim about the relative slopes follows from the fact that, when the countries have identical
Cobb-Douglas research technologies, γ N and γ S are identical constants and ω is independent of τ S and τ N . Then it is easy to see from (9) and (11) that the absolute value of the slope of S 1 S 1 must be greater than e ρ(τ N −τ S ) M S /M N , while the absolute value of the slope of N 1 N 1 must be less than
of Southern innovators (i.e., if p S ≤ w N a S ), then the second terms on the left and right-hand sides of (12) both vanish.
Comparing (11) In each figure, the North's best response function is depicted by a bold-faced curve. In Figure 1 , the best response curve has three sections; it includes the entirety of equal to τ S but slightly larger than it, the first-order condition for local maximization of U N would not quite be satisfied. The Northern government has a tiny incentive to reduce τ N to the point where it equals τ S . If it were to reduce τ N a bit more, so that it became slightly smaller than τ S , the marginal cost and marginal benefit of extending the patent length both would fall discretely; but, by the assumption 15 If the intersection of the N 1 N 1 curve with the vertical axis were to come at an ordinate greater thanτ , then the North's best response function would have a fourth, horizontal segment along which the limit on the maximum patent length ofτ would be binding. Also, if the N 2 N 2 curve were to hit the horizontal axis before τ S =τ , the best response function would include a segment with τ N = 0.
that underlies the figure, the former would fall by more. It would then pay for the Northern government to increase the duration of its patents back to the point where the countries' IPR protections are the same. For points along the bold portion of the 45
• line, the Northern government has a strict incentive to reduce τ N to equality with τ S from all points above the line. But the Northern government does not have an incentive to cut τ N to a length shorter than τ S , because the sharp drop in marginal cost at the point where τ S becomes larger than τ N is enough to make the government want to increase τ N back to equality with τ S at points just below the 45
• line. Finally, at the intersection of N 2 N 2 with the 45
• line, the first-order condition for local maximization of U N is satisfied as the Northern government increases τ N to equal τ S from below. At points above the line, the marginal cost of an increase in τ N exceeds the marginal benefit, so the government has incentive to reduce the patent duration back to the point of equality.
In Figure 2 for general production functions in the research sector, the various segments of the best response functions need not be everywhere downward sloping, nor must S 1 S 1 for example be steeper than N 1 N 1 at every point of intersection. Thus, in principle, there could be any number of Nash equilibria, some stable and others not. In a situation similar to that depicted in Figure 1 , it seems there is still another possibility. If the S 1 S 1 curve were to lie everywhere above the N 1 N 1 curve for τ N > τ S and the S 2 S 2 curve were to lie everywhere below the N 2 N 2 curve for τ N < τ S , then there would not exist any pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the patent policy game.
There is not much that can be said in complete generality about the Nash equilibria of the policy game. One notable feature of any such equilibrium is that it does not involve the harmonization of patent policies. This observation follows immediately from the fact that the best response function of the low-wage country never touches the 45
• line. For any patent policy that the North might choose, the South will either prefer that its patent lengths be strictly shorter than those in the North or that its patents be strictly longer than those in the North. This is because the South perceives a strictly higher marginal benefit from extending the duration of its patent when τ S is slightly above τ N than it does when τ S is slightly below τ N . When τ S < τ N , an increase in τ S extends the period of positive profits for Southern producers only in the Southern market. But when τ S > τ N , an increase in τ S extends a period of positive profits for these producers in both markets. Since the adverse effect on Southern consumers is the same in either case (if τ S ≈ τ N ), the Southern government never finds it optimal to mimic the patent policy of the North.
In reality, governments in the North typically grant longer patents and provide greater protection of intellectual property more generally than their counterparts in the South. In the next section, we will investigate how relative market size, relative endowments of human capital, and comparative advantages in manufacturing affect the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the policy game, when such equilibria exist. Our goal is to understand why the North may have a greater incentive to grant long patents than the South, and to identify conditions under which there is a unique equilibrium with τ N > τ S .
Why are Patents Longer in the North?
In this section, we explore the determinants of the national patent policies in a noncooperative Nash equilibrium. We do so by examining the comparative statics of our model, focusing especially on the case in which
We begin with the sizes of the two markets. If M S and M N both grow at equal percentage rates, then there is no change in Ω S , Ω N ,Ω S , orΩ N . By (9) and (10) there is then no effect on the S 1 S 1 curve or the S 2 S 2 curve. Similarly, by (11) and (12), the N 1 N 1 and N 2 N 2 curves remain in place. Also, there is no effect on the governments' preferred choices among the various local optima. It follows that an equi-proportionate expansion of the two markets leaves the Nash equilibrium patent policies unchanged. This extends our earlier finding for the closed economy: Balanced (ii) In the limit, as M N /M S → ∞, there is a unique Nash equilibrium with τ S =τ .
The first part of the proposition says that an increase in the relative size of the Northern market increases equilibrium patent protection in the North and decreases it in the South, provided that the equilibrium is unique before and after the change and that Northern patents are longer in each case. This result follows directly from the fact that the N 1 N 1 curve shifts up and the S 1 S 1 curve shifts to the left, as M N /M S grows. The second part of the proposition says that, when the Southern market is negligibly small compared to that in the North, the Southern government always sets a maximal patent length equal to the economic life of a differentiated product. This follows from the fact that the marginal cost of extending the patent becomes negative and large as M N /M S approaches infinity. We will say more about this in a moment.
Why does a change in the relative size of the markets change the relative incentives that the governments face in choosing their patent policies? The answer has to do with the effects of such a change on the marginal cost and marginal benefit of extending the length of patents in each country. Suppose, for example, that there is a unique equilibrium with τ N > τ S and that M N rises. This has no effect on the marginal cost of longer patent protection in the South (provided that we remain in a regime with τ N > τ S ). But since monopolists in both countries now realize a smaller share of their total profits from sales in the South, the responsiveness of innovation in each country to changes in τ S falls.
16 It follows that the marginal benefit of extending the Southern patent falls, and the South has less incentive to grant lengthy patents, for any given patent duration in the North. In the North, the expansion of market size causes a directly proportional increase in the marginal cost and marginal benefit of longer patents, since both the deadweight loss from monopoly and the consumer gains from greater innovation are realized by more households. But the marginal benefit gets an added boost, because innovation in both countries becomes more responsive to the Northern patent policy. 17 Thus, the Northern government has reason to lengthen its patents, for any given patent policy in the South.
However, for M N /M S large enough, it becomes a dominant strategy for the government of the South to choose a patent length equal to the full economic life of a product. The explanation for this is clear. For large M N /M S , the profit opportu- 16 Take, for example, the case in which τ N > τ S . In this case,
Then an increase in M N /M S reduces both (1/v N ) (dv N /dτ S ) and (1/v S ) (dv S /dτ S ). But these semi-elasticities determine the elasticity of research with respect to patent length in each country. 17 For example, with τ N > τ S , Next we consider the relative endowments of human capital, our proxy for the relative capacities for research in the two countries. We assume for this purpose that the demand for innovative products has a constant elasticity, as is the case when h(x) = x α for α ∈ (0, 1). First note that with Cobb-Douglas research technologies (and many others), an increase in H N /H S must increase ω, the relative research output of the North. 18 So we investigate the comparative statics of the system of (9) and (11) and the system of (10) and (12) with respect to changes in ω.
An increase in ω shifts the S 1 S 1 curve to the left, because the marginal cost of extending patents in the South rises relative to the marginal benefit from doing so.
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Intuitively, the marginal cost of increasing τ S is sensitive to changes in ω, because there is no profit offset to the loss of Southern surplus on Northern inventions as there is for Southern inventions. Meanwhile, an increase in ω shifts the N 1 N 1 curve . This is enough to ensure that
, which in turn implies that the left-hand side of (9) increases with ω by more than the right-hand side.
upward if w N is close to w S , but downward if w N is much larger than w S . In the former case, the marginal cost of extending patents falls relative to the marginal benefit, because the profits earned by Northern producers are an offset to the surplus loss from patents when goods originate in the North. In the latter case, the Northern For cases in which the initial equilibrium has τ S > τ N , we must look at the shifts in S 2 S 2 and N 2 N 2 that are induced by an increase in ω. We show in the appendix that with identical Cobb-Douglas research technologies and constant elasticity demands, the S 2 S 2 curve must shift to the left and the N 2 N 2 curve must shift upward (or remain in place) when ω increases. It follows that τ S must fall and τ N must rise in response to a rise in H N /H S when the initial equilibrium has longer patents in the South.
This suggests that an equilibrium with longer patents in the South may not exist at all if the relative research capacity of the North is sufficiently large. In fact, we can prove
any Nash equilibrium.
The proof involves our showing that (10) and (12) 
It is straightforward to check that when M N ≥ M S , the latter term must be the larger of the two when T S ≥ T N .
Thus, the two first-order conditions cannot both be satisfied for any τ S ≥ τ N .
We have thus identified conditions under which an equilibrium must be characterized by longer patents in the North than in the South. These conditions describe a market for innovative products that is at least as large in the North as in the South, and an inventive capacity in the North that is much greater than that in the South.
More generally, the greater is the research capacity in the North relative to that in the South, the more likely it is that there will be a unique equilibrium with τ N > τ S .
An increase in H N /H S increases aggregate profit income in the North relative to that in the South. Since the monopoly profits are an offset to the consumer cost of patent protection, the North's relative incentive to provide proprietary rights grows as its firms' relative share of world profits increases. lower value of a N /a S spells higher relative profits for a Northern monopoly, and thus a relatively greater value for Northern inventions. We find that v j is proportional to (b j /a j ) α/(1−α) , and thus ω is an increasing function of κ N /κ S .
International Patent Agreements
In this section, we will study international patent agreements. We begin by characterizing the combinations of patent policies that are jointly efficient for the two countries. 21 For the most part, we shall assume that the countries can offer and receive direct compensation -corresponding either to financial payments or to welfare transfers that are effected by concessions in policy areas other than IPR. Then the efficient patent regimes are those combinations of τ S and τ N that maximize the sum of the countries' welfare levels gross of any transfers. Arguably, an international negotiation can be used to achieve some such outcome, if the countries are discussing several issues simultaneously as part of a comprehensive trade negotiation and if there are no frictions in the bargaining process.
After we have identified the efficient policy combinations, we examine the inefficiencies that are present in a noncooperative equilibrium with τ N > τ S . By comparing the Nash equilibrium outcomes with the efficient policies, we can point to the changes in the patent regime that ought to be effected by an international treaty.
The final part of this section deals with the question of policy harmonization.
By that point, we will have shown that harmonization is not necessary for global efficiency. We will proceed to investigate the distributional properties of an agreement calling for harmonized patent policies and ask whether both countries would benefit from such an agreement in the absence of some form of direct compensation.
Efficient Patent Regimes
We begin with the assumption that countries can effect international transfers or provide compensation in other policy areas, so that the efficient patent lengths are ones that maximize the joint welfare of the two countries. We focus here on regimes with τ N ≥ τ S . A regime with τ S > τ N typically will not be efficient in our setting, because 21 Ours is a constrained efficiency, becuase we assme that innovation must be done privately, and that patents are the only policies available to encourage R&D. We do not, for example, allow the governments to introduce R&D subsidies, which if feasible, might allow them to achieve a given rate of innovation with shorter patents and less deadweight loss.
such a regime involves one and probably two extra distortions. First, when τ S > τ N , there is a period between the expiration of the two patents when a good invented in the North is produced competitively in that country. Since the original inventor earns no profits during this period of local production, there is no encouragement of R&D relative to the situation that would exist if these goods instead were produced in the South. But the Northern consumers enjoy less surplus with production in the North than they would if production were done in the South, which reveals an excess burden of the patent regime with τ S > τ N . Second, a regime with τ S > τ N has relatively more R&D taking place in the South than does a regime with τ N ≥ τ S .
But, as we will see below, in an efficient regime with τ N ≥ τ S the social marginal product of labor in the North's research sector typically exceeds that in the South's research sector. If it does, it would be costly to have an international patent regime with τ S > τ N that gives still greater relative incentive for innovation in the South.
Consider the efficient choice of patent policies τ N and τ S that will take effect at time 0 and apply to goods invented thereafter. The expressions for the countries'
gross welfare levels at time 0 are analogous to that for a closed economy, as recorded in equation (6) . If τ N ≥ τ S , aggregate welfare in the South is given by
where Λ S0 is the fixed amount of discounted surplus that consumers in the South derive from goods that were invented before time 0. For the North,
where Λ N0 is defined analogously to Λ S0 . In both (13) and (14), the second term is the income from home production of homogeneous goods, the third and fourth terms are the discounted surplus generated by goods invented in the South and the North, respectively, and the last term is the country's discounted sum of profit income.
Summing (13) and (14), we find that
It follows that changes in τ S and τ N that leave M S T S + M N T N unaffected leave v S and v N unaffected, and therefore also leave L S R , L N R , φ S and φ N unaffected. Such changes have no effect on the allocation of labor in either country and no effect on aggregate world welfare. 
efficient outcomes can be achieved without the need for international transfers. By appropriate choice of τ N and τ S with τ N ≥ τ S and M S T S + M N T N = Q * , the countries can be given any welfare levels on the efficiency frontier between that which they would achieve if T S = 0 and T N = Q * /M N and that which they would achieve
For distributions of world welfare in this range, the efficient patent regime is the same whether international transfers are feasible or not.
Only if it were desirable to give still more welfare to the North than this country enjoys when the patent lengths are such that T S = T N = Q * /(M S + M N ) would the feasibility of international transfers make any difference to the efficient allocations.
Pareto-Improving Patent Agreements
How The South's best response function for T N ≥ T S is given by (9) . In the Cobb-Douglas case, this too is a line, as represented by SS in the figure. Similarly, the North's best response function is described by (11) , which is represented by NN in the figure.
We show the QQ line being situated to the right of the SS curve and above the We can also calculate from (15) the social marginal product of labor in research in each country compared to its social marginal product in producing homogeneous goods. We find this ratio to
For constant elasticity and many other demand functions, this ratio is higher for the North than it is for the South. This validates our claim that it would often be beneficial to world welfare if the composition of world research could be changed in favor of relatively more innovation in the North. By the same token, a marginal increase in the length of Northern patents from a point along NN increases world welfare. Such a change in policy enhances profit income for Southern firms, and encourages additional innovation in both countries.
It follows, of course, that the QQ curve must lie outside any Nash equilibrium with T N ≥ T S . We record our finding in Proposition 3 Let (τ S , τ N ) be any Nash equilibrium in the policy game with τ N ≥ τ S and let (τ * S , τ * N ) be an efficient combination of patent policies. Then
The proposition implies that, starting from a Nash equilibrium in which patents are longer in the North than in the South, an efficient patent treaty must lengthen patents in at least one country. It also implies that the treaty will strengthen global incentives for R&D and induce more rapid innovation in both countries.
Harmonization
Commentators often claim that it would be desirable to have universal standards for intellectual property protection and for many other national policies that affect international competition. The arguments for harmonization are not always clear, but they seem to be based on a desire for global efficiency. Yet it is hardly obvious why efficiency should require identical policies in countries at different stages of economic development. In this section, we examine the aggregate and distributional effects of international harmonization of patent policies.
As should be apparent from the preceding discussion, harmonization of patent policies is neither necessary nor sufficient for global efficiency, regardless of whether international transfer payments are feasible or not. A regime of harmonized policies will only be efficient if the common duration of patents in the two countries is such that Q = Q * . And any combination of patent policies that provides the efficient global incentives for R&D will be efficient, no matter whether the patent lengths in the two countries are the same or not.
If patents are longer in the North than in the South in an initial Nash equilibrium, then harmonization might be achieved either by a unilateral lengthening of patents in the South or by a combination of policy changes in the two countries.
A unilateral lengthening of Southern patents is bound to harm the South (absent any side payments), because the equilibrium τ S is a best response function for the South and any unilateral deviation from a country's best response is, by definition, damaging to its interests. 24 As for harmonization that might be achieved through a combination of policy changes, we focus on a treaty that would achieve global effi- 24 See also Lai and Qiu (2000) , who consider the welfare effects of harmonizing IPR protection at the standard that would be chosen by the North in a non-cooperative equilibrium. In a model of once-off investment in R&D, they show that such a change in the South's policy from the Nash equilibrium level would benefit the North by more than it would harm the South. (11) when T S = 0. Since the NN curve is downward sloping in the Cobb-Douglas case, the fact that it starts below point H implies that the efficient harmonized patents are longer in both countries than the patents chosen in a Nash equilibrium.
Among all policy combinations that achieve global efficiency, the harmonized policies are the ones that provide the greatest benefit to the North and the least benefit to the South. Moreover, the South may be worse off at point H than in the Nash equilibrium at point E, unless some form of compensation is provided by the North.
The South certainly would be harmed by efficient harmonization if the research technologies were other than Cobb-Douglas and the initial Nash equilibrium happened to be at a point above and to the left of H. Then both the increase in the length of Southern patents and the decrease in the length of Northern patents would work to the detriment of the South. In this case, the North definitely gains from efficient harmonization. 25 In general, the larger are M N /M S and ω, the more likely it is that the North would gain and the South would lose from efficient harmonization. We conclude that harmonization has more to do with distribution than with efficiency, and that incorporation of such provisions in a treaty like the TRIPs agreement might well benefit the North at the expense of the South. In an open economy, countries face different incentives in setting their national policies due to differences in factor prices, market sizes, and capacities for doing research. We focused on policies that are applied with national treatment; that is, regimes that require equal protection for foreign and domestic applicants. A country's optimal patent policy is found by equating the sum of extra deadweight loss that results from extending patents for domestic firms and the extra surplus loss that results from extending monopoly pricing by foreign firms with the benefits that flow from providing greater incentives for innovation for firms in both countries. A country's optimal patent length depends on the policies chosen by its trading partner, because the foreign policy affects the global incentives for innovation and the relative numbers of patent-holders in each country.
Our analysis revealed a subtlety that arises whenever factor prices differ across countries. When patents are longer in the high-wage North, a lengthening of patents in the South postpones a period of competitive pricing by low cost producers. But when patents are longer in the low-wage South, a lengthening of patents in the North postpones a period of limit pricing by Southern innovators and a period of competitive pricing of goods invented in the North by high cost producers in that country. Due to this asymmetry between a patent regime with longer patents in the North and one with longer patents in the South, it is possible to have multiple equilibria in the policy game, or for there not to exist any pure-strategy equilibrium at all.
countries and of Canada, the United Kingdom and Japan.
We find that having a larger market for innovative products typically enhances a government's incentive to grant longer patents. Also, a government's relative incentive to provide protection typically increases as its relative capacity for research grows. In a noncooperative equilibrium, patents must be longer in a country whose relative capacity for research is sufficiently great, provided that its market size is no smaller than that of its trade partner. Thus, the large markets in the North and the relatively greater capacity for research there can explain why these countries often have stronger protection of intellectual property than their Southern trading partners.
Starting from a Nash equilibrium, the two governments will have an incentive to negotiate an international patent agreement. An agreement can ensure that national policies will reflect the positive externalities that flow to foreign residents when a country extends the length of its patents. To achieve (constrained) efficiency, an international agreement must call for a lengthening of patents in at least one country. The harmonization of patent policies is neither necessary nor sufficient for the efficiency of the global patent regime. If patent policies are harmonized at an efficient level, the move from the non-cooperative equilibrium typically would benefit the North quite possibly at the expense of the South.
Our analysis can be extended to more general environments. Two extensions come readily to mind. First, we have assumed that firms in the North must produce their innovative products locally, despite the lower wages that prevail in the South. We could easily modify the model to allow for direct foreign investment, and examine how such investment affects the national incentives for patent protection. Direct foreign investment (DFI) by Northern firms -when it occurs -increases the profits π N that flow to a Northern inventor, and (in most cases) the surplus C N m that accrues while a Northern firm holds a live patent. When τ N > τ S , the effect is to raise the marginal benefit of extending patents and reduce the marginal cost of doing so in both countries.
Second, we have assumed that the countries have similar demands for innovative products, except perhaps for differences in market size. If demand functions were to differ in the two countries, the deadweight loss that results from patent protection also would differ. Differences in demand would also be reflected in the characteristics of globally efficient patent regime. An efficient patent regime would equalize the marginal deadweight loss in the two countries associated with providing a given push to global innovation.
Appendix
In this appendix we examine how changes in ω shift the S 2 S 2 and N 2 N 2 curves. We focus on the case in which the North and the South share identical Cobb-Douglas research technologies and the demands for the differentiated products have constant elasticities.
Shifts in S 2 S 2
We will prove that the S 2 S 2 curve shifts to the left when ω increases. To this end, note that the right-hand side of (10) is a decreasing function of τ S . We will show that, starting from a point on the S 2 S 2 curve, where the left-hand and right-hand sides of (10) are of course equal, an increase in ω increases the left-hand side by more than it increases the right-hand side. Then a reduction in τ S will be needed (at given τ N ) to restore equality between the two sides of the equation.
Let R S (ω; τ S , τ N ) be the ratio of the right-hand side of (10) to the left-hand side of (10) . With γ S = γ N , a necessary and sufficient condition for ∂R S /∂ω < 0 is 
The left-hand side of (A2) can be written asT (C It follows that an increase in ω shifts the S 2 S 2 curve to the left.
Shifts in N 2 N 2
To see how an increase in the relative innovation rate in the North affects the N 2 N 2 curve, we focus on the case of a moderate gap between the wages in the North and in the South. In such circumstances, a Southern innovator will be forced to reduce its price in the North at the time that its patent expires there in order to deter potential competition from Northern imitators. 27 With a constant elasticity of demand for differentiated products, h(x) = x α for α ∈ (0, 1). Then a price cut occurs after the expiration of a patent in the North whenever w N /w S < 1/α.
We aim to show that the N 2 N 2 curve shifts up with increases in ω. At an initial value of ω, the left and right-hand sides of (12) are equal for any point on N 2 N 2 .
We need to establish that, starting from such a point, an increase in ω decreases the left-hand side of (12) by more than it decreases the right-hand side. Then an increase of τ N -which reduces the right-hand side without changing the left-hand sidewill be needed to restore the equality between perceived marginal cost and marginal benefit of lengthening patents in the North.
Let R N (ω; τ S , τ N ) denote the ratio of the right-hand side of (12) to the left-hand side of (12). With γ S = γ N , a necessary and sufficient condition for ∂R N /∂ω > 0 is But the latter equality implies thatΩ N = 0. Therefore, ω does not appear in the equation for the N 2 N 2 curve. Clearly, a change in ω has no effect on the North's choice of patent policy (for τ N < τ S ) in this case.
replace T N and T S in this term by the larger numberT to obtain a sufficient condition for ∂R N /∂ω > 0. We can also replaceΩ N /Ω N by (π S −π S )/π S , becauseΩ N /Ω N < (π S −π S )/π S . After making these substitutions, the resulting sufficient condition is µ π S −π S π S ¶ C It is straightforward to verify that
for all w N /w S ∈ (1, 1/α). Therefore, inequality (A4) is satisfied, which is sufficient to ensure that (A3) is satisfied. This establishes that an increase in ω shifts the N 2 N 2 upward when w N /w S < 1/α.
